GOPEurope

Federalist No. 10

2005-09-29T12:39:00.000-07:00

The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
By James Madison
Published in the Daily Advertiser
Thursday, November 22, 1787

For those who are not familiar with Federalist #10 and the danger of constitutional parties, I have provided the text for you. Food for thought.

To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, -- is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS

A Tale of Two Germanys

2005-09-20T12:41:00.000-07:00

Henry Nickel
Germany's Broken Party-based Election System
Reaction to the September 18 Poll
Berlin Germany

As Berlin goes so Germany goes. It is a city that condenses all the fragmentation and contradiction of this nation in one place. The name itself, iconic. It is at once a symbol of hope and doubt, joy and fear, triumph and tragedy. It is sophisticated and degenerate, inspirational and irritating, cosmopolitan and provincial. It is German.

The post-World War II West German Republic was never intended to be strong or politically efficient. Following the disaster of fascism, the last thing West Germans and the world wanted was a government able to effectively implement the majority will of its people, favouring broad consensus rather than popular dictatorship. Majority rule was unacceptable, proportional rule with significant power allotted minorities was the only conceived way to prevent a relapse into oppressive government. The post-war constitution and governments since 1949 have been an acknowledgement that Germans intrinsically do not trust each other, to a certain extent even fear each other.

Shame of being German starts at an early age, when young students are exposed to the horrors of the holocaust and the madness of Nazi militarism. It is hard to flip through an evening broadcast and not find some documentary detailing the grim history of German dictatorship and defeat in the first half of the 20th century. It is difficult to be a proud German, even today.

Among the many humiliations following their defeat in World War II was the redrawing of Germany’s borders and eventual division of the country into the communist East and the free West. The expulsion of Germans east of the Oder River from what became Polish territory consolidated the German people into the nation we now call Germany. By 1949 Germany was the subject of a great Cold War experiment, to prove once and for all the inferiority of socialism. Furthermore, many Europeans felt a divided Germany was in their best interests. Some still do.

If Germans had any semblance of an identity before the war, it was certainly eviscerated in the immediate years following. The west quickly became a towering demonstration of free market dynamism, the east a daily reminder of the backwardness of socialism. West Germans, though cognisant of their past, had much to be proud of in the decades following the war. Though partisanship existed, there was unity of vision and general solidarity of purpose with the nations of the west. Yet for many Germans in both the East and the West there lingered the dream of reunification. In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the inevitable implosion of the communist regime of East Germany, this dream began its steady transformation into hard reality.

It didn’t take long after the euphoria of reunification for Germans to find themselves internally at odds with each other. The de facto one party dictatorship of the east was wiped away and the western system adopted. Yet the distortions of more than 40 years of Soviet style socialism in the East did not undergo the same organic healing process experienced in so many other Soviet Block nations. Many from the West quickly began to feel that they were subsidizing the dependency of those from the east that could now claim generous entitlements under the west’s “social model”. As the years went by, the parties positioned themselves to leverage advantage in an increasingly divided country. The socialists once led by such seeming moderates as Helmut Schmidt, moved decisively more to the left. Conservatives that held a virtual monopoly on the Chancellorship for 16 years found themselves out of power. What had seemed so promising was quickly turning ugly. The promise of a united Germany was slowly showing itself in reality to be a deeply divided Germany, perhaps more than it had been before. The dream of one Germany where its people could once again identify themselves as “German” seemed rather a pipe dream.

Germans today effectively share one of two identities, 'Ossi' or 'Wessi'. Those from the former east are often viewed as ignorant, unrefined and lazy, the thankless beneficiaries of the west's 'solidarity' subsidization. Those from the west are often viewed as arrogant, cold and greedy, unwilling to accept their fellow citizens from the east as true fellow Germans. Today the hope and promise following the ‘Fall of the Wall’ more than 15 years ago has now eroded into fear and loathing. The rigidity of the German bureaucracy, combined with a hopelessly embattled multiparty proportional system of government has left a nation, compelled to restructure and reform itself, stagnating. Many recent graduates have their eyes set on careers anywhere but Germany.

Decades of socialization in both west and east programmed much of the German public to immediately turn to government for solutions to their problems. At the same time German voters feel distant and unable to influence their government. Sunday’s poll saw the second lowest turnout in post-war German history and by far its most disturbing result.

In Germany, parties rule and much of the public distrusts them. Voting is more often motivated by a desire to prevent a particular party from dominating than to support a particular platform. This “voting in the negative” only adds to existing public cynicism exacerbating the already significant divide in western and eastern public opinion. Accountability to one's party is the first law of survival for a German politician. Parties lay down the rules and decide who gets the privilege of leading. The layers of decision makers and interests, extend the distance between constituents and their living breathing representatives. Few Constuents have ever contacted their representitives office, much less know who they are. The party is the real representative, a colourful logo with a catchy slogan. These faceless institutions are entrusted with the duty to serve the people.

It is hard to know exactly where the buck stops in German politics, you often get the feeling it's nowhere. "What choice do we have?" is a common response from disenchanted voters. Passive political attitudes are not only typical among German voters but chilling in their implication, a haunting reminder of Madison's Federalist #10. Just how willing are voters to capitulate to a nebulous party organization, opaque institutions that have little personal accountability to constituents? How can such organizations effectively address the underlying needs of the German people in moments requiring decisive leadership? Are the institutional interests of a party able to adequately respond to the needs of the nation? These are the true great questions to arise out of the September elections. Called because of a crisis among the parties, little else.

Germans have much reform to consider, but I would venture to say following the disaster of this most recent election they must recognize that their party-based election system is broken. Today’s Germany requires leadership, not faction. The lessons of the past should invoke restraint, not fear of changing what is now a broken system. Germany needs flexibility to adapt to the rapid pace of change in the modern world and not continuously struggle with internal divisions that only irritate existing anxieties and hinder the growth, progress and great contributions of the German people.

Henry Nickel is Chairman of the U.S. Republicans Abroad in Germany and a regular writer and commentator on Atlantic relations. He can be reached for comment or inquiry at hnickel@gopgermany.com.

What Happened to Germany?

2005-09-16T18:25:00.000-07:00

Henry Nickel
Excerpt from 'Reviving Atlanticism'
Report on the 2004 Elections
Berlin, Germany

As it has been throughout the 56-year history of their republic, Germans will decide the course of their history in elections this Sunday, September 18. However, one must consider the circumstances under which Germans find themselves these days, distanced from the United States and lynchpin in a seemingly dysfunctional European Union. Following the orchestration of a vote of no confidence and subsequent approval to dissolve the Bundestag, socialist Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is now facing his greatest test of political resiliency. It appears at first glance he will fail. However, his conservative challenger Angela Merkel appears destined for a German-style winner’s curse while forced into a coalition with the current ruling Socialists. Encountering dismally high unemployment, growing domestic anxieties and increasingly hostile public opinion toward the United States, one can’t help but ask what has happened to Germany and hope Ms. Merkel’s conservatives can once again place Germany and the Atlantic community of nations onto a productive track.

Recent years have witnessed calls among various constituencies in this nation and elsewhere to revive Atlantic dialogue, as though it at one time existed or has for some reason ceased to exist. History demonstrates that our centuries’ long relationship spanning the Atlantic, from the earliest days of our nation's evolution and the more recent immediate decades following the Second World War, has neither been one of perfect cooperation nor irreconcilable animosity. As national leadership transitioned from right to left and back among the Atlantic nations, a constant political flux guaranteed a relationship that was at times rough and occasionally frigid. Yet there remained a consensus of principle that united the Atlantic community, despite the personal or political inconsistencies arising from time to time.

It was during the close of World War II that the concept of Atlanticism finally took root, institutionalized by NATO, normalized through strong economic ties beginning with the Marshall Plan and realized through demonstrations of Atlantic solidarity beginning with the Berlin Airlift. During the period of the Cold War Atlanticism blossomed only to wilt following the collapse of the Soviet regime and Warsaw Pact. Nearly two decades on, the Atlantic community of nations that now includes those liberated European Soviet block nations along with allied democracies around the world, confront a new threat.

International terrorism and its underlying extremism endanger not only the existence of states, but the very foundation of free society. To defeat extremism is to inoculate hate, desperation and distrust through the extension of freedom, representative government and opportunity in both the Arab world and beyond. This requires the resolve of nations, united under principles of liberty, faith and democracy, unhindered by fear. This requires a revival of Atlanticism.

Atlanticism found its zenith during the closing years of the Cold War. Confrontation with Soviet aggression and the necessity of military deterrence naturally found its strongest voice among conservatives, whatever party affiliation or name they used to identify themselves. Surrender to the Soviet system was non-negotiable, though at times naive attempts to rationalize Soviet tyranny clouded common sense.

Often the most passionate reinforcement of Atlanticism emanated from one point, Berlin. The telemetry of the Cold War’s political crossfire of rhetoric and ultimatums regularly passed through a city divided by forces of oppression and through a nation repeatedly caught in the vise of history. Berlin and the broader defense of West Germany would become icons of the tense standoff between liberty and subjugation. What is truly ironic is how the eventual reunification of Germany and the West's victory in the Cold War signaled the end of Atlanticism.

The reunification of Germany, more than any other single event, deflated Atlantic solidarity. Victory spelled obsolescence to many who through reluctant necessity embraced Atlanticism. This was the case in much of Western Europe that soon turned its full attention to expanding and deepening the European Union. In the U.S., a sense of obsolescence also existed. A new era meant the election of a new type of president and diminishing investment in and importance placed upon maintaining effective defensive and offensive military capability both at home and abroad.

More than a half century of peace, secured largely by a strong American presence, allowed Europeans to evolve social models, possible only by diverting resources away from otherwise essential investments in defense. This distortion had negative consequences on both sides of the Atlantic. For one, it made the U.S. vulnerable to serious economic downturn and restructuring should the necessity of Cold War military expenditures come to a sudden end. In Western Europe, generations came to rely on artificial institutionalized welfare states, subsidized essentially and in large part through the diversion of what would have otherwise constituted military expenditures. Leaders across Europe basically knew they could count on U.S. intervention if any real threat emerged, while many of their constituents ignorantly criticized their American protectors’ presence. The end result was to slam a wedge between the Atlantic as the sledgehammers landed on the Berlin Wall.

The succeeding years opened a floodgate for the European left as conservative Atlanticism, rooted largely in the necessity of a common defense, suddenly disappeared from Europe’s political radar. Western Europe’s welfare states remained in the wake of the Cold War and had no use for conservatism. In some cases, conservatives in Europe had no use for each other. In Great Britain, Prime Minister Thatcher was lynched by her own Torie party that would later lynch itself. Chancellor Kohl and his party eventually found themselves victims of success, not unusual in Germany. And the leaders of France could finally express their true sentiments without the nagging necessity of grudging gratitude toward the United States.

Nearing two decades on, the world now finds itself embroiled in a new standoff. Americans find themselves deeply indebted to revive a capable military force and make up for a decade of inadequate military investment. In certain European capitals, leaders are scratching their heads in light of their rather hollow prominence in the world, when they aren’t screeching about feeling disregarded by "America". Among European conservatives, there is often an eerie silence, when they aren't further marginalizing themselves through infighting or heaping excuses for inaction in futile attempts to save face.

It is not difficult to recognize that Arab nations cannot boldly embrace freedom, hope and democracy when the most iconic of democratic nations don’t appear to embrace each other. Squabbling rather than solidarity seems to largely dominate an Atlantic community where the left now largely dominates Western European politics.

Unless conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic once again take the reigns of Atlanticism, we can only expect this to continue festering. That is until common sense evolves into necessity and we have no other choice. However, waiting will likely exact a heavy price on Europe in terms of its security and stability. In Europe there remains a misconceived notion of serving as a 'counterbalance'. Such talk would have been utter blasphemy during the years of the Cold War, however seductive to the European left. Why should it be any different now?

To revive Atlanticism, Europe’s conservatives must once again assert principle, not apologize for it or worse yet mutter excuses for total inaction. For its part, U.S. conservatives at all levels must rediscover the necessity of reconnecting to their natural counterparts in Europe at both the grassroots and grasstops, communicating a message of solidarity. Interesting enough, Berlin and Germany may once again emerge as a focal point for such efforts. Without the baggage of entrenched nationalism and a necessity for reform, Germany’s conservatives may hold the key. Already Conservatives hold the largest plurality in the country. A fresh message from a conservative party many Germans regard as stale, could tip the balance in a country quietly longing for reassurance, change and returning to a prominent position on the world stage. Germany for once could take a stand and assert a positive and courageous conviction on its own accord. By doing so it would rejuvenate a relationship that brought lasting positive change to the world.

Henry Nickel is Chairman of the U.S. Republicans Abroad in Germany and a regular writer and commentator on Atlantic relations. He can be reached for comment or inquiry at hnickel@gopgermany.com.

Innocence Abroad

2005-09-16T18:12:00.000-07:00

Eric Staal
Editorial
November 22, 2005
Frankfurt, Germany

In light of how the media and political elites in Europe continue to denounce the war in Iraq and openly criticize the reelection of President George W. Bush, it is surprising that their reaction to the replacement of Secretary of State Colin Powell with Condoleezza Rice has been so favorable. After all, Powell was widely regarded in Europe as the single moderate voice in an administration of hawks.

Despite the positive remarks about Condoleezza Rice from German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and his French counterpart Michel Barnier, it is important not to underestimate the depth of anti-Americanism in Europe and its impact on U.S. foreign policy around the world.

Over the previous two years, opportunistic leaders in Belgium, Germany and elsewhere rallied behind French President Jacques Chirac as he vigorously lobbied against a final UN Resolution on Iraq. Since then Chirac has continued to undermine the legitimacy of American foreign policy, in recent days again blaming the war in Iraq for increasing terrorism. One of Europe's most prominent critics of American foreign policy is Daniel Cohn-Bendit, co-chairman of the Green Party in the European Parliament, who routinely appears on German talk shows advocating that the international community not get involved in Iraq until the United States fails.

Of course, most European anti-Americanism is targeted at Bush. Upon news of his re-election, Hans-Christian Ströbele, deputy head of the Green Party in the German Bundestag, declared his "worst nightmares had come true" and pronounced it "a black day for peace". His counterpart in the ruling Social Democrat Party, Michael Müller, argued Bush's re-election is "neither good for the world, nor for a democratic America." Perhaps even more worrisome were protestations against the U.S. electorate in mainstream publications such as Der Spiegel or The Daily Mirror, which malign extremist and ignorant American voters for re-electing a war-mongering President.

Why are the United States and its twice-elected head of state so thoroughly reviled in Europe? Europeans would simplistically blame the administration's policies for the backlash. However, the European political and media elite made their hostility toward Bush known when he was a candidate in the 2000 election. Even in the weeks following 9/11, the United States did not enjoy the fabled goodwill many commentators claim existed. On the contrary, the German weekly Die Zeit, France' Le Monde and the UK's Guardian -- to name a few -- were littered with articles echoing the grievances of Osama Bin Laden about American support for Israel and hegemony in the Middle East. If Osama Bin Laden needed any help recruiting terrorists, the European media certainly provide plenty of free advertising.

What is more accurate therefore is that the political and media classes in Europe are reacting to the Republican electoral success with the same hysteria as liberals in the United States, i.e. with intentional distortions of U.S. conservatives as backwater fundamentalists led by a cabal of sinister Neocons. For the secular left, the Republican proposition of social values and free enterprise coupled with a strong stance against terrorism is too threatening. The day after the election, for example, the award-winning national German talk-show Hart aber Fair featured a Green Party leader denouncing America's war for oil and, more emblematic of the problem, an American journalist who received applause for comparing U.S. Christians to the Ku Klux Klan.

It is important to understand that modern American conservatism has no equivalent in Europe and has never been accepted as legitimate in European intellectual circles, which are monolithically both secular and liberal. There is no National Review or Weekly Standard, no talk radio personalities or Fox News to challenge the liberal orthodoxy. Serious ideological diversity among think-tanks and political foundations in any European country is negligible.

Just how much influence do these opinion shapers have? The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Survey from March this year noted that "solid majorities in France and Germany believe the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism in order to control Mideast oil and dominate the world." In Turkey "as many as 31 percent say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable." Turkey is important, because it stayed out of the coalition in Iraq and we know whose club it wants to join.

What can be done to mitigate European anti-American sentiment when it boils over into anti-American action? To say the U.S. Foreign Service has neglected to defend American policies in Europe over the previous decades is an understatement. The first Bush administration struggled to find a solution with the establishment of a White House Office of Global Communications during the Iraq war and the appointment of advertising expert Charlotte Beers to head public diplomacy at the State Department. However, more needs to be done to tackle the problem at its European source.

With the appointment of Rice to Secretary of State there is an opportunity to take a fresh approach. The pervasive nature of the problem suggests the need for a paradigmatic shift and a retooling of U.S. foreign policy resources. Ambassadors can be geared to play a more vigorous role in winning support for U.S. policies in major European media markets. The administration can take a more coordinated and proactive approach to dealing with the foreign media. If needed, a special assistant or spokesperson can be appointed in key embassies to help coordinate the international communication of U.S. foreign policy and even represent the administration in selected fora.

Overcoming decades of anti-American propaganda and failed U.S. public diplomacy in Europe will not succeed overnight. Without a strategy for attacking the roots of European anti-Americanism, however, it is only a matter of time before the new Secretary of State and U.S. foreign policy run into more European roadblocks.

Eric Staal submitted this editorial in a volunteer capacity as Communications Director of the U.S. Republicans Abroad in Germany. Send comments or inquiries to Eric R. Staal at erstaal@hotmail.com.

The Importance of European Public Opinion for U.S. Foreign Policy

2005-09-16T18:01:00.000-07:00

Eric R. Staal
Republicans Abroad Regional Conference
May 7 – 8, 2004
Berlin, Germany

I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to you about U.S.–European Relations and to share with you my personal views about what Republicans Abroad could do to improve European perceptions of American and Republican principles. I know that beyond the election many of us are interested in how we can be good ambassadors of our country in Europe. That’s what I am here to talk to you about today.

Let me begin by sharing with you excerpts from the introduction of the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey:*

"A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war’s conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America’s credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the U.S.-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans, want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States."

In Muslim countries the study found that “anger toward the United States remains pervasive" while Osama bin Laden is viewed positively by majorities or near majorities in Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco. "Even in Turkey . . . as many as 31% say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable." Finally, "solid majorities in France and Germany believe the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism in order to control Mideast oil and dominate the world." Eighty-five percent of French and Germans polled view President Bush unfavorably.

It would be an understatement to say that these trends are not encouraging, especially given that hey have been getting worse over the past 3 years. However, this is not simply a problem of what the man on the street thinks. We saw over the past two years how opportunistic leaders in Europe rode the wave of anti-American sentiment to political victory and lobbied world opinion against U.S. policies. Spain is the most recent example.

At various times over the past 40 years, European leaders from Jean Monnet to Charles de Gaulle to Jacques Delors to Jacques Chirac have been allured by the prospect of a united Europe that could act as a counterbalance to the United States. Perhaps it is just a historical coincidence that all these leaders have been French, but I will leave you to draw your own conclusions. Nowadays, however, such thinking has become popular throughout Europe. And those who pursue this vision of a European counterweight tend to view American power as illegitimate in and of itself.

This is not meant to sound alarmist. We can and do cooperate with European nations across a range of regulatory, law enforcement, trade and other matters. Let us also not overlook that even France and Germany are contributing to Iraqi reconstruction by forgiving Iraqi debt. However, it is important to understand that anti-Americanism in Europe is a serious problem.

It will not go away with the bonhomie of Schröder’s visit to the White House last March, or by selective cooperation, or, unfortunately for Kerry, even with a change in leadership. Nor does it have much to do with the war on terrorism. The roots of European anti-Americanism run deep, European misperceptions of the United States are great, and irresponsible politicians are in plentiful supply to turn Europe into an obstacle for American foreign policy from Brussels to Beijing. Without a sustained effort to rally European hearts and minds to the American cause of freedom, Europe will be a thorn in our side.

Therefore, let me try to address 3 questions in the time we have today:

- First, what is the depth and seriousness of anti-Americanism in Europe?
- Second, what are the roots of this anti-Americanism?
- And third, what can we as Republicans Abroad do to counter the trend and support U.S. foreign policy?

Before addressing each of these questions, let me say that, like many of you, I have followed European affairs with more than a passing interest for quite some time. In fact, I can remember living up in Hamburg as a high-school student back in 1988. At the time I hitchhiked with a friend of mine to Berlin. I recall the Wall, which divided this city and how the notion of freedom in Eastern Europe was little more than a courageous vision for Ronald Reagan and a band of Republicans.

The time I have spent in Germany and Europe on and off over the past 15 years - both in academia and in business - has afforded me plenty of opportunities to engage in political discourse with my counterparts, including many a late-night tête-à-tête over a nicely-poured German Pilsner.

And I am sure that, as a Republican, I am not alone in arriving at some frustration with how some Europeans view the United States. The view one often encounters is simple really. There are two major parties in America: a good party and an evil party. The good party wants to feed the poor, guarantee the rights of women and minorities, meet the needs of the elderly, abolish pollution, and create global peace and harmony.

The evil party, meanwhile, wants to destroy sundry species, contaminate the drinking water, create poverty and indiscriminately bomb 3rd world countries. I will leave you to guess which is the good party from the European point of view. Well, the point of this mockery of is that there is a strong tendency in Europe to oversimplify American politics and a tendency to consider Republican views on domestic and foreign policy to be illegitimate. Worse yet, European prejudices about the United States even undermine our foreign policy at times – both in Europe and beyond.

What is the depth and seriousness of Anti-Americanism in Europe?

The first thing to bear in mind about anti-Americanism in Europe is how the election plays into it. Unfortunately, Kerry's attempt to deconstruct Bush's record in Iraq is lending credibility to anti-American views in the war on terrorism. Kerry's 1st line of attack is to blame the administration for the tragedy of September 11, in the 9/11 Commission and he is letting Richard Ben-Veniste do his handiwork. Short of blaming Bush for 9/11 outright, a 2d line of attack is coming from Kerry's henchmen Dick Clark and Bob Woodward, who are undermining the legitimacy of the war in Iraq by arguing that Bush planned to overthrow Saddam Hussein prior to 9/11.

Never mind the fact that members of the Administration made their concerns about Iraq public throughout the 1990s. Kerry’s 3rd line of attack is most problematic for our purposes: Kerry wants to hold the administration responsible for the abysmal diplomacy between the Franco-German axis and the United States. Of course, this severely obscures Franco-German culpability in the souring of relations over Iraq. In particular, it diverts attention from how Chancellor Schröder jettisoned the Atlanticist pillar of German foreign policy for his reelection; and it diverts attention from Dominique de Villepin’s odyssey through Africa to sabotage the UN resolution and rescue French contracts from the fate of “Bush’s war”.

Kerry is making a short-term gamble that he can build his future diplomacy on the very legitimacy he now undermines. It would seem he anticipates that a reparation of relations with European countries is a mere matter of him being a new man for a new season! But it shows a facile understanding of real European views, and it is a high-stakes game that it is unlikely to succeed.

A Kerry presidency would also inherit Iraqi reconstruction. And it is hard to imagine Kerry would be able to abandon U.S. efforts in Iraq very easily; or that Europeans will suddenly become more enthusiastic about supporting U.S. initiatives in Iraq with him as President. As a case in point, in the current German Presidential election, candidates on both right and left are more or less competing to be more critical of American efforts in Iraq. The Schadenfreude about the deteriorating situation in Iraq is almost overwhelming. How will Kerry respond when terrorists attempt to cower him the way they recently pulled the strings of Spanish foreign policy?Stepping back from the voltage of the current situation and from the election, we should take a sobering look at the depth of the anti-American wellspring from which Kerry is drinking. For, as we know, the war on terror is not the cause of European resentment of the United States, but just the long-awaited catalyst for it.

Looking back we can easily trace European anti-American and anti-Republican sentiments throughout the 1990s. The Iran-Lybia sanctions Act, various trade disputes, and the Helms-Burton Act were only some of the substantive irritations for which Republicans were blamed in Europe. European mockery of our constitutional crisis over Clinton’s Lewinsky scandal was even more illustrative of how different European and Republican views are. Indeed, European distaste for Republicanism can be traced even further to at least Reagan’s presidency. Reagan’s Presidency confounded Europeans: it placed ideals above pragmatism, freedom and capitalism above the Cold War status-quo, imports of goods and capital above exchange rates, and small government above the misguided social-engineering of the New Deal and Great Society.

During the 2000 election few European capitals contained their preference for Gore over George W. Bush. Along with the American left, European predictions were common that an intellectual lightweight such as George W. Bush would be a destabilizing influence on world politics. If Bush was incompetent, then his advisors were too bright. Leftists from Berlin to Berkeley, California warned that Bush would not keep up with his own team intellectually. Needless to say, few Europeans who are convinced Bush ‘stole’ the election can articulate a basic understanding of our electoral college, let alone its philosophical and constitutional underpinnings.

It may sound jarring, but the depth of anti-Americanism in Europe is illustrated not by the war in Iraq, but by the war in Afghanistan. After 9/11 the United States received universal proclamations of solidarity from European leaders, and NATO’s Article V provision for mutual defense was invoked for the first time. Yet, even then the depth of anti-Americanism in Europe was palpable: the language between the lines and behind the scenes was that the United States had finally received payback for decades of unequivocally supporting Israel, and for pursuing its naked self-interest in securing oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. Europeans wondered why they should be drawn into a U.S. conflict of its own making.

Thus, even before Iraq was on the agenda, there was broad cynicism about the war in Afghanistan in Europe. Many were the expert predictions that U.S. ignorance of the foreign geography and politics would lead to military disaster in the Vietnam of the 21st century. Two things prevented European anti-Americanism from boiling over during the Afghanistan war: One was the fact that the war took place in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the link between Osama bin Laden and the Taliban was undeniable; the other was that the war culminated swiftly in the images of men shaving their beards and women dropping the burka to bask in the glow of freedom for the first time in more than a decade. Washington received European approval for its measured and successful execution of the war. The underestimation of U.S. capability and planning was quickly forgotten - until the same cynicism reared its ugly head in mid-2002.

Let me just say that we should not place blame on the Bush administration for the transatlantic acrimony over the Iraq war. Unfortunately, even now neither the Franco-German leadership nor the broader European public seems to grasp the geopolitical stakes in Iraq. The fact that almost all of the September 11 hijackers were Saudi Arabian led to the conclusion that our biggest ally in the Middle East, without which a containment of Iraq or Iran would be impossible, had spawned a menace.

Against the backdrop of 9/11, there was an imperative to establish a foothold of democracy in the region, to send a beacon to reformers in the Middle East, and to send a signal to local rogues and terrorists that their days were numbered. The United States could no longer wait for better days in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; nor could it rely on Saudi Arabia for regional security. The U.S. strategic vision, the long-term U.S. commitment to democracy, the U.S. agenda for a more secure and prosperous Middle East – all have been almost completely overlooked in the European debate about Iraq.

What does this depth of anti-Americanism mean for U.S. foreign policy? There was no leadership in France or Germany to mitigate the radical anti-Americanism. There was no statesman like Helmut Kohl to put the Atlantic Alliance above domestic politics, or to ignore French schemes to build European unity at the expense of American legitimacy. We have learned a hard lesson about the reality of opportunistic leadership in Europe. Unless we engage in the battle for hearts and minds, it will be a matter of time before we find ourselves standing without our key allies in the struggles ahead. The Kerry campaign will not help the cause.

What are some of the roots of anti-Americanism in Europe?

As mentioned, misperceptions of the United States run historically deep. There is a vast philosophical divide between European elites and U.S. Republican leaders when it comes to international and American domestic politics. We must recognize the differences in both spheres, in order to engage in meaningful political discourse with our European counterparts and to avoid debating the Straw Man they use to undermine our credibility. By way of example, let me address each sphere.

On the international level, the United States is obviously a global power with global responsibilities versus Europe, which is a conglomeration of players limited to regional influence. Whereas the United States determines existential questions of peace and security from N. Korea to North Africa, Europe clearly does not play this role. Indeed, for the better part of the last 60 years, Europe has been preoccupied with its own national-security on the doorstep of Stalin’s empire, with its own economic reconstruction and welfare state, and with its own political integration. In the past decade Europe has been fixated on making sure its regional integration outlives the Cold War, and on filling the void left by the implosion of the Soviet Union.

The logic of regional politics in Europe dictates working through multilateral cooperation and institution building. But Europeans are quick to transpose this approach to the global level, where the context may not be appropriate. Republicans understand that no amount of institutional cooperation, consensus building, and dialogue at the UN could have reformed the Taliban regime, or would forestall ad infinitum that a Saddam Hussein or Osama Bin Laden will get weapons of mass destruction. Back in Washington, American decision makers are keenly aware that inaction means regional tyrants and networks of terrorists will flourish. On 9/11 Washington saw how a decade of complacency resulted in catastrophe.

Even as these differences in how to approach world politics persist, Europeans aspire to overcome the disparity of influence between Europe and the United States. As mentioned earlier, more and more, the goal is not merely to play a greater international role, but to 'counterbalance' American primacy, which is looked upon as illegitimate in and of itself. Observers in Germany even note that anti-American sentiment is strong enough to make pacifists support defense spending in the name of a stronger Europe.

We must be careful not to underestimate the Gaullist ambitions of those who wish to use Europe to rein in American power. However, we must also apply Rumsfeld’s diplomatic masterstroke of dividing Europe between 'Old' and 'New' carefully. Only a united Europe will be in a position to contribute significantly to joint transatlantic initiatives, while a weak and divided Europe will make the world a lonely place for American democracy. This tension is why the battle for hearts and minds in Europe is important to us over the long-term. The battle for hearts and minds is what hangs in the balance to determine whether Europe is with or against us in the future.

On the domestic level, the philosophical differences between Europeans and Americans are even greater. Europeans look to the United States and see what Europe is not – 45 million people without health insurance, crumbling public education, appalling levels of violent crime and numbers of young men in prison, a disproportionate use of energy resources coupled with an assumed disinterest in conservation, and lest we forget, budget deficits that Chancellor Schröder can only dream about.

For Europeans of the left and the right, the solution to American social problems is to be more like Europe; and, in European eyes, the party that wants to use government to solve social problems is the Democratic Party. However, in this respect important differences are overlooked. The United States is vastly more geographically, economically and ethnically diverse than any European country. It does not lend itself to one-sized fits all solutions and government, just as Europe taken as a whole would not. Most Europeans would admit that it is erroneous to compare the United States to individual countries in Europe.Yet, few Europeans understand the importance of devolution for the Republican movement, allowing states to regain prominence in the political lives of our citizens, and making government more accountable.

Republicans are ahead of their time in Europe, just as they were ahead of their time in the United States in 1964. With proper explanation, one can find sympathy for a Republican agenda among Europeans. For example, many educated Europeans do not really understand the differences between our presidential system of democracy and their parliamentary systems.

Therefore they are surprised to learn how limited the President’s control over policy and legislation formally is. By explaining the unique autonomy of Congress and Courts and the historical development of these branches of government, you can make a cogent argument that Republican intellectuals and leaders have been in the driver’s seat of reform in the United States for 25 years. We have a record to stand on anywhere in the world!

For all of European exposure to American pop culture and infotainment, very little is really understood about the unique international responsibility history has thrust upon American shoulders or the unique constitutional framework of our domestic politics. Yet these things can be communicated and, in so doing, the legitimacy of our leadership can be given its due recognition.

Given the depth and sources of anti-American sentiment, what can we as Republicans Abroad do to serve as ambassadors in Europe?

First, let us recognize that we want a Europe with which we can cooperate, not just on trade and regulatory issues, but on broader geopolitical matters such as the war on terror. Over the long-run, if European decision makers and elites continue to feed the cancer of anti-Americanism, our struggle for peace and prosperity worldwide will only face more violent resistance -- egged on by European opinion shapers and ignorant mobs. U.S. credibility will constantly be under fire, our voice drowned out of the debate, and our goals that much harder to realize.

A simple change in leadership or a change in policy directions on either side of the Atlantic will not be enough. Radical Islamists fed on deep misperceptions about American leadership will not lay down their arms for a President Kerry, or because France and Germany suddenly forgive billions of dollars of Saddam Hussein’s debt. Make no mistake about it, anti-Americanism is viewed favorably in today’s Europe - not just among Greens, Social Democrats and parties of the left.

Even on the mainstream right mistrust of U.S. foreign policy is prevalent and conservative parties fail to identify with U.S. Republicans. To give an example, just this past week the General Secretary of the CDU spoke out in favor of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein – he is the first member of the CDU to do so until now, a year after the war!

Let us not fail to communicate the importance of European attitudes to our leadership back home. Let us not neglect that European anti-Americanism is waiting to exploit the next story of torture from an Iraqi prison, or the next bomb that misses in a terrorist safe haven. Let us not wait until another populist impulse puts a united Europe on a collision course with American foreign policy and recklessly derails our legitimacy in other countries. But also let us not just simply raise awareness. Rather let us come forth with a concrete agenda for action on two levels.

First, we must shore up support among our own ranks. This can be done by perhaps hosting a Republican Conference on the topic of U.S.-European relations and inviting guest from the U.S. and Europe as speakers. We can inform our members by contributions to our website and links to important other websites. There is strength in numbers, so our efforts at recruitment would also help.

In similar fashion, we can also target our grasstops efforts at mainstream conservative groups in Europe. We can do this by more frequent dialogue to articulate the Republican vision of freedom and entrepreneurship. Official state visits can go a long way to building goodwill. But we must engage in the debate on a day-to-day basis here in Berlin and other capitals, just as leftists from the United States and Europe do on an ongoing basis. We can work with some of the think-tanks to present and debate our views at conferences and other events. We can invite conservative thinkers to Europe for a lecture series or roadshow. All in all, by making our message known, we can step by step restore the legitimacy of our purpose.

Secondly, we must also prevail upon those European leaders who have built their own political fortunes on anti-Americanism - firmly reminding them of the damage they have wrought. There should be no illusions. French and German contributions to Iraqi reconstruction are welcome, but unless public endorsements for U.S. policy take the place of earlier public denouncements, we cannot allow ourselves to be satisfied. When U.S. initiatives to offer NATO-Partnerships to countries in the Persian Gulf are met with cynicism about U.S. motives, we know where that cynicism has been feeding. When Turkey denies the U.S. military right of passage, we know whose club it wants to join. We as Republicans Abroad have a duty and special role to play in speaking out against anti-American demagoguery in Europe.

Demagogues must be called by their names and there is always room for more of a rhetorical offensive. When President Bush is called the greatest threat to world peace, we are not debating the war on terror or the virtues of American foreign policy. We are debating worldviews. And those who open that debate must be cornered into positions where their moral bankruptcy and vacuous principles become obvious. We must hold those who have spread the cancer of anti-Americanism in Europe to account in the public square, the same way they have abused the public square to distort and manipulate the motives of what we stand for as Americans. This goes for European commentators, as well as American ones who visit Europe to peddle their ignorance - Michael Moore comes to mind as an example.

Republicans Abroad should articulate their agenda for domestic and international reform. We can build stronger bridges to mainstream parties. And we can remind foreign leaders that allies do not feed anti-Americanism. We can remind a foreign public that allies defend the legitimacy of our cause, even when they differ about the means to achieving it.

We will not overcome the legacy of European anti-Americanism overnight and we will continue to struggle with its consequences in the war on terror. But we can build bridges and defend our convictions. Republicans have been on the right side of history since the Civil War, and we can remind Europeans that we plan to stay there.

Eric Staal presented these remarks to participants at the conference in a volunteer capacity as Communications Director of the U.S. Republicans Abroad in Germany. Send comments or inquiries to Eric R. Staal at erstaal@hotmail.com.

* All quotes from, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of American in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Released March 16, 2004).